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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
EDWARD E. McHENRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8756 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT 
The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbing 
Wallace E. Naylor, General Manager of the Safe way 
Store, located at 17th South and 4th East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the 16th day of February, 1957, and was sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law for the crime of robbery as 
charged (R. 6, 12, 24). 
The facts as presented to the Trial Court are suffi-
cient to prove that a robbery was committed on the day 
and at the place above mentioned. The defendant denies, 
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however, that he committed the robbery and alleges that 
there is not sufficient competent evidence to prove that 
he committed the same. 
This appeal is directed to the insufficiency of the 
evidence to connect the defendant with the crime com-
mitted; to the admissibility of the evidence offered to 
identify the accused and to the admissibility of certain 
exhibits and other evidence which prejudiced the defend-
ant and denied him the right to a fair trial. 
The defendant is impecunious, was and now is repre-
sented by court appointed counsel (R. 7). 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
STATEMEXT OF FACTS 
Thoughout the entire trial of this case the State was 
allowed, over the objection of the defendant (R. 17) to 
introduce evidence of a wholly independent and unrelated 
crime. The court in overruling the defendant's objection 
admitted the evidence for the purpose of identification 
only (R. 17-18). 
l\fr. Naylor described the defendant as being about 
5'10" tall, weighing around 160 pounds, with a little dif-
ferent talk than Inost fellows and with a blood spot in the 
corner of his right eye (R. 16). Even though he had given 
such a vivid description of the defendant, the court, over 
the objection of the defendant, permitted hini to testify 
concerning a previous robbery on the 11th day of Febru-
ar~r, 1957 (R. 18). The court permitted this evidence for 
the purpose of identification only (R. 17). 
The tP~ti11wn~· of 1\Ir. Naylor concerning the crime 
of February 11th did not show any connection between 
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that crime and the one which the defendant wa.s being 
tried for, and did in no way legally identify the defend-
ant. The evidence merely shows that Mr. Naylor was 
robbed on February 11th by two persons dressed simi-
larly. During the robbery of February 11th the assailants 
approached their victim outside of the store, forced him 
to enter and attempted to force him to open the safe (R. 
90-110)._ The robbery of February 16th was committed 
by two persons who gained entrance through the roof of 
the .store (R. 13, 39). 
Mr. Naylor claimed to be able to describe his assail-
ant by reason of the observations made on the 16th day 
of February, 1957, from a line-up at the Police Station 
at noon on that day. He was able to pick out the defend-
ant as one of his assailants. He identified the defendant 
by reason of a blood spot in his right eye and by reason 
of hi.s voice and size (R. 21). 
The entire testimony of one of the State's witnesses, 
Oliver Nickel, who was the produce clerk employed by the 
Safeway Store above mentioned, pertained to a robbery 
at the s.ame store on the 11th day of February, 1957 (R. 
90-110). From a casual observation of Mr. Nickel's testi-
mony it becomes obvious that the same does not in any 
way add to the identification of the defendant. Mr. 
Naylor was permitted to so testify even though he was 
not present at the time the second robbery took place 
(R. 95-96). Mr. Naylor's first contact with the defendant 
was at noon on February 16th at the Police Station (R. 
97-98). His testimony identified the defendant as being 
the {)Brson in the store on February 11th, but he did 
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not identify the defendant as being the person in the store 
on February 16th (R. 98). 
A Mercury automobile containing a suitcase with 
two 22-calibre revolvers, both loaded, was found parked 
on Westminster A venue just east of 4th East and ap-
proximately two blocks from the scene of the crime (R. 
129-131, Exhibits 13 and 14). Over the objection of the 
defendant, Lyman S. Burton, one of the State's witnesses, 
was permitted to testify concerning the ownership of 
the automobile and its contents (R. 129-132). The only 
evidence offered as to the ownership of the automobile 
and its contents is the testimony of Officer Burton, which 
is as follows : 
"Q. Did you make an investigation to determine 
the ownership of the car~ 
A. Well, it had temporary stickers on it. It had 
not had license plates yet. It was newly pur-
ch~sed and had temporary stickers on it. I 
read the name on those. 
Q. Did the sticker show the registered owner' 
A. It did. 
Q. What was the name of the registered owner? 
MR. WOOLLEY: Objected to as hearsay. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Edw,ard McHenry. 
Q. (1\fr. Child) Did you gain access to the car? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you find ,anything inside of it' 
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A. Yes, there was a sport coat.-
MR. WOOLLEY: We object to this line of 
questioning your Honor. It is irrelevant and 
immaterial, and has not been connected up 
with this case 1 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
A. There was a sport coat, a p.air of slacks, and 
in the back seat, on the floor, was a suitcase 
and then there were miscellaneous things in 
there, flashlight, and can openers, I do not 
recall. 
Q. (Mr. Child) I will show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 15 and ask you if you can 
identify that 1 
A. Yes, that is the suitcase which was on the 
back, on the floor of the back seat of the 
'57 Mercury. 
Q. Did you open the sui tease at that time 1 
A. Not at that time. I did not open it until I 
took it to the police station. 
Q. Did you then open it 1 
A. I did. 
Q. What did you find inside, if anything 1 
A. Two 22-calibre revolvers, and both fully load-
ed, and I believe there was a picture, but 1 
don't remember, in the little carrie·r in the 
suit case, where you put handkerchiefs and 
things like that. That was all that was in the 
suitcase." 
Exhibits 13 and 14 were later admitted in evidence 
over the objection of the defendant (R. 133). 
Following the defendant's arrest he was taken to the 
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interrogation office at the Police Station and interro-
gated by Officer Clore and Officer Fillis (R. 149-150). 
Officer Fillis was permitted to testify as to statements 
made by Officer Clore to him concerning the robbery 
and the .apprehension of the defendant (R. 150-151). 
Officer Fillis made certain threatening statements to th~ 
defendant which caused the defendant to make admis-
sions against his own will, which admissions Officer Fillis 
was permitted to testify to (R. 152-153, 160). In this 
connection the record is as follows: 
Cro.ss examination 
"Q. Then I believe it was about then you stated, 
'Look Buddy, we can do this two ways, the 
easy way or the hard way' and you took about 
two steps toward me and said, 'I would just 
as soon do it the hard way.' 
Isn't that true~ 
A. I do not recall any threats being made what-
soever. 
Q. Didn't Mr. Clore state in the preliminary that 
you said that? 
A. What Mr. Clore testified to I cannot testify 
to." 
Redirect examination 
"Q. Were there any threats of any type used in 
the interrogation room against Mr. Edward 
McHenry, the defendant here, in your pres-
ence? 
A. Not in my presence, no, sir. 
Q. Is it possible you said, 'We can either do this 
the easy way or the hard way'? 
A. It is very possible. 
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Q. If you said that, why did you say it~ 
A. In any type of work there is always an easier 
way to do things. The easy way in this in-
stance would have been for him to tell us, 
as we asked, a particular question, so we 
could go out and check, rather than go out 
and bit by bit pull in witnesses and evidence, 
such as we had to do in this case." 
This appeal is directed at the errors committed by 
the trial court in admitting evidence of a wholly inde-
pendent and unrelated crime, in admitting evidence as to 
the owner.ship of a certain automobile and its contents, 
and in permitting testimony concerning statements al-
legedly Inade by the defendant under compulsion, all of 
which prejudiced the jury and denied defendant the right 
of a fair and impartial trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF AN INDEPENDENT AND UNRELATED CRIME. 
POINT II. 
THE ·COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING A MERCURY AUTOMOBILE AND ITS CON-
TENTS. 
POINT III. 
STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE UNDER 
COMPULSION WERE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF AN INDEPENDENT AND UNRELATED CRIME. 
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The court in admitting evidence of a robbery which 
allegedly occurred on the 11th day of February, 1957, at 
the same place as the crime of February 16, 1957, preju-
diced the defendant and denied him the right to a fair 
and impartial trial. Evidence of independent and un-
related crimes is inadmissible and prejudicial. This rule 
is so universally recognized and so firmly established 
that citation of authoritie.s to support the same is un-
necessary. It is the product of that same humane and en-
lightened public spirit which has decreed that every per-
son charged with the commission of a crime shall be 
protected by the presumption of innocence until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There are cer-
tain exceptions to this rule which state that evidence of 
another crime is competent to prove the specific crime 
charged when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, 
( 3) the absence of mistake or accident, ( 4) a common 
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or 
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one 
tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the 
person charged with the commission of the crime on 
trial. 
The court in the in.stant case admitted evidence of 
other crimes for the purpose of establishing the identity 
of the accused. Such evidence has been admitted and 
found competent in almost every court in the United 
States, including our own in the case of State v. Marti-n 
(1917), 49 Utah 346, 164 P. 500. If, however, the identity 
has been otherwise clearly made out, such evidence should 
not be introduced, since, in such case, it could have no 
other effect than to prejudice the defendant by estab-
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Iishing his guilt of an independent crin1e. ±2 A.L.R. 2d 
862. 
In order for evidence to be competent to prove 
identity the evidence of the independent crime must be 
connected as a part of a general and composite scheme 
or plan. Some connection between the crime must be 
shown to have existed in fact and in the mind of the actor 
uniting them for the accomplishment of a common pur-
pose. This connection must be clearly apparent from the 
evidence. To allow the evidence otherwise would be to 
poison and prejudice the minds of the jurors by the use 
of irrelevant and dangerous deception. The admissibility 
of this type of evidence must rest on the facts in each 
case. There cannot be many cases where evidence of 
separate and distinct crimes will serve to legally identify 
the person who committed the crime as the s.ame person 
who is guilty of another. It is much easier to believe 
in the guilt of an accused if he is suspected of committing 
other similar crimes. Evidence of independent crimes 
unnecessarily burdens the defendant in his attempt to 
overcome the charge against him. It gives opportunity 
for conviction upon prejudice instead of competent evi-
dence. Miller v. State (1917), 13 Okl. Crim. 176, 163 P. 
131, 43 A.L.R. 2d 868. 
The evidence in the instant case shows that the de-
fendant could be identified without the unnecessary in-
troduction of evidence of an independent and unrelated 
crime. Mr. Naylor described the person who robbed him 
as being approximately five feet ten inches tall, weighing 
one hundred sixty pounds, with a voice different from 
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that of the general public and .a blood spot in the corner 
of his right eye. He also picked the defendant out of the 
line-up at the Police Station at noon the day of the 
robbery for which the defendant is charged by reason 
of his size, voice and the blood spot in his eye. Even 
though he so ably identified the defendant he was per-
mitted to testify to circumstances surrounding the crime 
of February 11th, a wholly independent and unrelated 
crime. In this connection his testimony was contradic-
tory, uncertain and ambiguous. He was not sure that 
the defendant wore the same type of clothing when both 
robberies occurred (R. 17). He was not certain in his 
description of the gun used. In this connection the best 
answer he could give was : "I am not sure whether i~ 
was that gun." (R. 18). 
Oliver Nickel was petmitted to testify as to the rob-
bery of the 11th day of February, 1957. He was permit-
ted to so testify even though he was not present at the 
time of the robbery for which the defendant is charged. 
His testimony adds nothing to the identification of the 
accused and was highly prejudicial. The Utah case of 
State v. Martin, supra, can be dis.tinguished from the 
instant case. In the Mart in case the State was permitted 
to introduce evidence of certain letters written by the 
defendant for the purpose of identification. The con-
tents of these letter.s clearly indicated that the person 
attempting the commission of the robbery was the same 
person who allegedly committed the robbery in question 
and that it was com1nitted at the sa1ne place and upon 
the same person. In Miller v. State, supra, the court 
states: 
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"If the defendant wrote the letters in ques-
tion, and the jury found that he did write them, 
then the contents of those letters clearly identify 
the defendant as the person who committed the 
robbery in question." 
The evidence offered concerning the crime of February 
11th does not consist of statements, written or oral, by 
the defendant, and does not clearly identify the defend-
ant as the person who committed the robbery in question. 
Because the defendant could be identified without 
admitting evidence of a wholly unrelated and independent 
crime, and because the evidence admitted concerning this 
alleged independent and unrelated crime adds nothin.g 
to the identity of the accused, the evidence should have 
been excluded, the same being gravely prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
POINT II. 
THE ·COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING A MERCURY AUTOMOBILE AND ITS CON-
TENTS. 
The State was permitted to introduce evidence con-
cerning the ownership of a Mercury automobile and its 
contents over the objection of the defendant that the sante 
was hearsay. The only evidence offered as to the owner-
ship of the automobile was the testimony of Officer 
Burton who said that the name on the sticker was that 
of the defendant. This evidence is incompetent for the 
reason that it is hearsay and does not come within any 
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule and further, no 
proper foundation has been laid. 
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg 
(Utah) 315 P. 2d 277, the court admitted testimony about 
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the alcoholic content of a blood sample over the objection 
of the defendant that no sufficient foundation had been 
laid identifying the blood sample analyzed as being the 
blood of the defendant, Chugg. This court found that 
the admission of said evidence was error. The only evi-
dence introduced was that of the medical technician at 
the hospital where Chugg was taken after the accident. 
The medical technician did not draw the sample from 
Chugg, nor was she present when it was taken. No at-
tempt was made to introduce in evidence the actual speci-
men of blood allegedly taken from Chugg. The court 
stated: 
"Clearly there is a lack of necessary evidence 
linking the sample analyzed with the blood sample 
drawn from Chugg and is therefore insufficient 
to identify the blood sample as being that of 
Chugg." 
In the instant case Officer Burton did not prepare 
the sticker found on the automobile, nor was he present 
when the same was prepared. There is no evidence as 
to who prepared the sticker or when the same was pre-
pared. No attempt was made to introduce into evidence 
the sticker or any official record to show the actual own-
er.ship of the automobile in question. There is not suffi· 
cient evidence to link the automobile with the defendant. 
The evidence offered consists of the testimony of 
an individual concerning what he read from a report of 
another, which report consisted of a sticker on an auto-
mobile containing the name of an individual. The state-
ments were offered in evidence as proof of the matters 
asserted on the sticker, which is an untested assertion 
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made out of court and not subject to cross examination. 
The evidence is prejudicial to the defendant because 
the automobile was found so close to the scene of the 
crime and in said automobile a suitcase was found con-
taining two .22 caliber revolvers, both loaded (R. 131). 
The revolvers were later admitted in evidence as Exhibits 
13 and 14. Again the minds of the jurors were poisoned 
by the admission of incompetent and prejudicial evidence. 
POINT III. 
STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE UNDER 
COMPULSION WERE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
The court permitted Officer Fillis to testify concern-
ing certain statements made by the defendant while being 
interrogated at the Police Station. In this connection 
the record is as follows : 
"Q. Did you ask him any questions~ 
A. I asked him how many robberies he had com-
mitted~ He stated 'The one today, and the 
one last Monday.' 
MR. WOOLLEY: Objected to on the ground 
there-that this is going to be in the nature of 
a confession, no proper foundation laid. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (Mr. Child) Your answer was two robberies 
he had committed~ 
A. His answer was two, 'The one today and the 
one last Monday.' 
Q. Did you ask him specifically as to what rob-
bery he meant as to last Monday~ 
A. I said, 'The Safeway Store,' and he said, 
'Yes.' 
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I asked him what other robberies he had com-
mitted, and he said, 'Just those two.'" (R. 
151-152). 
There was no proper foundation laid for the admission 
of this evidence, further the same was admitted even 
though the alleged statements were made under compul-
sion. Officer Fillis denied making any threats to the 
defendant while interrogating him, however, the record 
shows without doubt that threatening statements were 
made in an effort to induce the defendant to make a 
confession. 
There are two facts which render a confession in-
admissible as evidence. First, one obtained under com-
pulsion, thus violating the defendant's constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination, and second, one 
made under such circumstances rendering the confession 
untrustworthy. When a confession falls within either one 
of the above, the law excludes them whether they be 
direct confession.s or other declarations tending to im-
plicate a prisoner in the crime charged. Miller v. State, 
supra. By the admission of this evidence more poison 
was administered to the jury in an effort to black out 
justice and deny the defendant the right of a fair and 
impartial trial. 
CONCLUSION 
One of our basic fundan1ental rights under the Con-
stitution of the United States and the State of Utah is 
that of a fair and i1npartial trial. Embodied within this 
constitutional right is the right to be tried for the crime 
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charged and none other, and to be convicted only upon 
competent evidence. The trial court in admitting evi-
dence of a wholly unrelated and independent crime, and 
admitting hearsay evidence and evidence obtained 
through force and threat, erred. The sole effect of the 
evidence so admitted was to poison and prejudice the 
minds of the jurors against this defendant. 
In the interest of substantial justice the conviction 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
1007 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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